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ABSTRACT
Regional governments, particularly those representing distinct communities,
are typically thought to pursue power of self-rule, or the ability to self-govern
within their own regional jurisdiction. In contrast, limited attention has been
paid to the importance of granting substantial influence via shared rule, or
the ability to co-exercise authority over the state as a whole. Yet, central
governments who fail to provide some form of guarantee regarding the
authority to self-rule may face ongoing challenges to their legitimacy,
authority, and ability to govern. As a result, granting shared control over
modifications to their legal status may help to pacify demands from restive
regions and those geographically separated from the state’s centre.
Analyzing the relationship between self- and shared rule across regional
governments in Europe, the Americas, and Asia, I examine how the horizontal
dimension of multi-level governance can serve as an accommodation
strategy by central governments.
KEYWORDS Decentralization; shared rule; self-rule; credible commitment; Asia
In recent decades, special autonomy arrangements have become a common
mode of mitigating the persistent threat of separatist pressures and ethno-
nationalist demands that lead to the forcible break-up and creation of new
states. Such special arrangements can improve state capacity by devolving
authority from the centre outward to the governors of restive regions, some-
times in the absence of comparable (or any) powers for non-restive regions.
As such, their creation as a form of conflict or dispute resolution theoretically
marks a departure from expectations in the existing literature that argues that
state-building efforts typically focus on centralization of authority in an effort
to thwart regionalist pressures (e.g. Soifer 2015).
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Alongside special autonomy, states may pursue decentralized forms of
governance for a variety of reasons, though two of the most common expla-
nations are functional and communal pressures. Functional pressures lead to
decentralization of authority over policy-making and/or financing because
governance necessitates it. Thus, functional pressures result in decentraliza-
tion because subnational units are more effective and efficient at the
process of governance across their aggregated units than the central state
is at governing the entirety of a state’s territory. Functional pressures are
abundantly clear when considering geographically diverse or dispersed
states, like archipelagoes, and states with a diversity of population densities
and locations, split between highly urbanized and sparsely rural.
In contrast, communal pressures are typically assumed to arise when
populations at the subnational or regional level are somehow distinct from
the wider population of the state. In federal states, the presumption is
often that all subnational units exhibit some degree of distinction and this
justifies high levels of subnational control. In unitary cases, such pressures
tend to be less universal and result in different forms or degrees of decentra-
lization to accommodate only certain subgroups. As a result, territorialization
and asymmetries in the power relationship between central and subnational
governments have long been perceived to result from variations in the
ethno-nationalist/linguistic composition and/or the economic strength and
bargaining capacity of subnational regions. The desire for self-governance,
particularly in regions marked by territorially concentrated national minority
groups or where particular resource or economic endowments exist, tends to
not to be uniformly distributed across a national population. Similarly, press-
ures for self-governance are also constrained by opportunity structures and
the cost of failing to achieve such goals, which are also likely to be non-
uniform in distribution across both time and space.
In newly independent nations, the process of governing may be compli-
cated by potentially competing pressures with respect to political insti-
tutional choice: institutions that can help to provide collective goods and
services versus institutions that can accommodate a wide variety of group
interests. In states with more diverse populations and geography, these
two institutional goals are more likely to be at odds. Particularly in post-colo-
nial states, such as those in Asia and Latin America, the processes of conflict
management and state-building are often dramatically complicated by the
diversity of the population of the newly formed states and the institutions
left behind by the former colonial power(s). The combination of diverse
populations and varied colonial legacies resulted in wide disparities in the
authority vested in different subnational regions in the newly independent
states.
Decentralized authority can provide a state with a solution to communal
pressures for self-governance. However, in post-independence, post-
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conflict, or weak states, the effectiveness of this solution is predicated on the
ability of the state to credibly commit to regional self-governance. I argue
that granting regional self-rule authority, understood to be the ability of a
regional government to exercise its authority within its own jurisdiction, is
insufficient to mitigate communal pressures because fears of recentralization
will persist. However, regional governments can be granted the power of
consultation or veto with respect to changes to the legal statutes or consti-
tutional provisions that protect their specific self-rule authority. This power,
referred to as ‘bilateral constitutional reform authority’, can serve as a credible
commitment of a central state’s intentions to enshrine regional self-govern-
ance. While other aspects of self- and shared rule may help to bolster regional
self-governance and alleviate separatist pressures or grievances, the power to
be consulted and/or to veto changes to a region’s legal status serves as a
unique signal of the central state’s commitment to continued regional auth-
ority. In the following sections, I outline a theoretical framework for under-
standing this credible bargain made between central states and special
status regions and evaluate empirical patterns in this relationship in a
sample of special status regions in the Americas, Asia Pacific, and Europe in
2018.
The utility and limits of self-governance to satisfy regional
pressures
Pressures for self-governance can be resolved contentiously and peacefully,
but self-governance demands may turn secessionist and violent. Disputes
regarding issues of self-determination and autonomy are more likely to esca-
late to full-scale civil war (Marshall and Gurr 2003), among the more difficult
conflicts to resolve via peace agreements or some form of negotiated settle-
ment (Walter 2002, 2004, 2014), and oftentimes cannot be deterred simply
because a group’s chance of winning such a conflict is highly improbable
(Sambanis and Milanovic 2011). Indeed, one reason for the popularity of
power-sharing agreements is that they ostensibly provide some form of
‘guarantee’ about the state’s commitment to the terms of peace in post-
conflict states (Hartzell and Hoddy 2003).
As a response to conflict, decentralization may be seen as a way to achieve
democratic consolidation by sharing power with local authorities, even as it
may also result in minorities becoming more marginalized or vulnerable
within the context of a divided society (Lijphart 2004; Reilly 2001). A long-
standing debate on whether regionalization moderates or intensifies seces-
sionism has led to mixed findings regarding the ability of federalization to
ameliorate violence or exacerbate and politicize differences among groups
by institutionalizing local distinctions (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004; Bermeo
2004, 475–477; Horowitz 1991; McGarry and O’Leary 2009; Roeder 2007;
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Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). Decentralization may initially serve to reduce
social conflict by more efficiently allocating economic resources (Horowitz
2006), but subsequently lead to greater sovereignty demands by empower-
ing subnational units and providing the resources and justification to
mobilize for even more self-determination (Brancati 2006; Hechter 2001;
Weingast 1995). In other words, dispersion of authority and resource
control may lead down a ‘slippery slope’.
Asymmetric forms of power dispersion were originally posited to encou-
rage this ‘secession potential’ (Tarlton 1965, 873), a conception that has
gained political traction during debates in recent years about the position
and pressures for greater autonomy in ethnically or economically distinct
regions such as Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland. Many scholars point to
ethno-national or ethno-linguistic cleavages as the lines along which self-
determination pressures emerge in order to protect minority identities in
plural societies (Keating 2001; Kymlicka 2001; Watts 1999). On a more norma-
tive level, the debate over asymmetric decentralization tends to stem from
the ability of a single system of government to satisfy different conceptions
of equality for citizens: universal decentralization is insufficient to offer min-
orities appropriate levels of rights, protections, and control (Agranoff 1999;
Requejo 2005; Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2014) while asymmetric decentralization
may lead to the elevation of specific groups over others (Barry 2001).
Asymmetries in subnational power and authority are common to all
federal systems and many unitary decentralized systems, but vary in the
level of disparity in the power and authority held by distinct subnational
units (Agranoff 1999; Elazar 1987; Watts 1999). These disparities in power
can complicate the process of governing. For example, many of India’s
states hold special agreements with the central government and result in
extremely diverse state-level party systems and levels of public expenditures
(Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Saez and Sinha 2010). In Belgium, the federal
system provides for ethno-linguistic distinctiveness to remain a basis of sub-
national policy-making in the three territorially defined regions (Swenden
2002), though this can often lead to instability in or the inability to form a
government. In post-Franco Spain, which arranged for special agreements
in several provinces, constitutional reformers believed separatist issues and
minority concerns to be among the most contentious, divisive, and poten-
tially destabilizing issues immediately following the democratic transition
(Díaz-López 1981; Moreno 1997). In the context of multinational societies,
the underlying assumption is that the balance in political authority
between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ is difficult to maintain and inherently
unstable (Zuber 2011).
Alongside the endowment of power over self-determination, the concept
of intergovernmental systems point to the reality that the ability to govern
within one’s own group or region is often insufficient to improving
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governability and state capacity. This is because the process of self-govern-
ance may be affected by decisions retained as part of the central govern-
ment’s power. An example of this comes from Scotland, where Scottish
Parliament holds the power to set the base and rates of income taxes but
the UK Parliament determines what taxable ‘income’ is (McEwen and Peter-
sohn 2015). While the ability to set the base and rate of income tax is a tre-
mendous level of authority for a regional government to hold, the
practicalities of executing that authority are still heavily constrained by the
centre. One solution to this constraint, especially common in federal
systems, is to allow regional governments the ability to share rule with the
centre on important and potentially contentious issues, in addition to allow-
ing self-governance within their own regional jurisdictions.
Within the realm of decentralization, there are two primary forms through
which authority is vested. Self-rule refers to the ability of a regional govern-
ment to exercise authority within its own regional jurisdiction. In other
words, to what degree does a regional government have self-governance
authority as distinct from the authority the central government has within
its own region? With respect to conflict alleviation and territorial manage-
ment in multiethnic and multinational societies, previous work has largely
focused on pressure for and the acquisition of self-rule. This is built on an
assumption that the primary concern of regional governments is to control
region-specific policies and address regional constituent needs, without
central interference. Indeed, this is what political actors in search of self-gov-
ernance often draw attention to when making appeals to their constituents
(McEwen and Petersohn 2015, 192). This is especially the case where press-
ures for decentralization emerge from communal, rather than functional,
sources: if a region’s population sees itself as a distinct community from
the population of the rest of the state, it may care little about co-exercising
authority over the populations of the other regions while it ultimately is con-
cerned about central intrusion into its specific domain (c.f. Hausing 2021).
However, a long-standing literature in federal studies addresses the ability
of a regional government to co-determine authority within the broader state,
known as shared rule. This conceptualization of subnational authority con-
siders the degree to which a regional government participates with the
central government and other regional governments in a policy-making
process that applies to all regions. Combined with self-rule, these forms of
authority delineate the degree to which regional governments can both uni-
laterally exercise control within their own home region and co-exercise
control within the larger state (Elazar 1987; Watts 1999). Evaluating the role
of shared rule, with its focus on how and under what context subnational
governments and actors participate in and actually influence national
policy-making, thus improves scholarly understanding of power distribution
within decentralized systems (Mueller 2014). Though much of the work on
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shared rule focuses explicitly on the relationship between self- and shared
rule in federal systems (e.g. Mueller 2014), the concept and theory have appli-
cations for other decentralized systems as well.
There are many different aspects of shared rule that can shape how
regional governments and citizens influence national policy decisions and
the subsequent exercise of power within the region itself. For example, the
ability of subnational governments to co-determine tax and borrowing pol-
icies can alter the sources and amounts of revenue that subnational govern-
ments can rely upon to implement locally preferred policies. Additionally,
routine meetings or consultations among national and subnational policy-
makers can provide an important resource for information sharing between
subnational governments seeking innovative ways to improve local govern-
ance. For example, Swiss local government associations can help to coordi-
nate policy knowledge and response among the communes vis-à-vis the
higher-level cantons, suggesting that vehicles for coordinated networking
can provide benefits to local governments at multiple levels (Mueller 2014,
99).
Nevertheless, these expressions of co-determination share one attribute in
common: they do not explicitly address or extend the power of regional con-
sultation or veto over the legal statue codifying a region’s self-rule authority.
Though different dimensions of shared rule are undoubtedly critical to fully
realize the potential for self-governance, there is one specific reason why
self-rule authority is insufficient to satisfy regional governments: fear of
recentralization. There are numerous political reasons why regions may be
skeptical or suspicious about the central government’s commitment to ensur-
ing their self-governing authority. For instance, partisan goals may differ
across the national political spectrum. Thus, regional governments may
worry about the election of a different party or coalition than that which pro-
vided the decentralized authority, which could result in the new government
retracting the endowed authority. Alternatively, it may be that the region
possesses a key resource. In the event that markets shift or the national
economy weakens, the central state may try to retrench the fiscal control it
previously gave to or shared with the region.
More simply put, the self-governance authority granted by the central
state during decentralization may not suffice for regions seeking greater
authority or independence because that granting of authority represents a
commitment of questionable credibility by the central state. Since power is
often perceived to be ‘given’ by the centre, regions worried about the credi-
bility of the central state’s commitment to their right to self-governance may
assume their only option is to forcibly coerce the state to continue to let them
govern themselves or perpetually threaten to seek or force the issue of a
region’s independence. It may be quite difficult to make credible a central
state’s claim to be committed to a region’s self-governance. Even the
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signing of a formal peace agreement or law on a region’s self-governance fra-
mework may not suffice to convince a skeptical region of the central state’s
commitment.
However, one way through which the central state may offer a credible
commitment to a region’s continued ability to self-govern is to provide
some form of legal guarantee to the region. For example, the region may
hold a veto regarding any modification to the constitutional or legal frame-
work that enables or ensures the extent of the region’s self-government. A
veto over changes to the legal status of the region should provide
sufficient assurance that the central state cannot unilaterally modify the
status quo of regional self-governance. Alternatively, in the absence of a
regional government veto over the region’s legal status within the state, a
requirement of regional government consultation may satisfy regional
elites. Although it may serve as a weaker signal of central state commitment
compared to a full veto, a required regional government consultation can still
play an important role in shaping ongoing negotiations and compromises
between national and subnational actors. Consultation may also provide
the space for citizens and civil society organizations to insert their perspec-
tives into the legal amendment process.
I have argued that even a substantial commitment to regional self-govern-
ance is unlikely to satisfy regional elites in the absence of some mechanism
for signalling credibility on the part of the central state, such as providing
the right of consultation or veto power over alterations to the legal status
of the region. The greater the check on central state decision-making pro-
vided to the region, the more likely that check is to serve as a credible
signal regarding the central state’s commitment to regional self-governance.
When a regional government perceives the central state to have made a
credible commitment, the regional challenge to state-building and peace
maintenance should abate. This is particularly true for regions with demo-
graphic and/or governance distinctiveness.
However, it is also possible that a central state perceives that offering
greater guarantees of its willingness to co-exercise its commitment to
regional self-governance may subsequently signal to regional leaders their
relative power over the centre. Consequently, this can lead to a process
that emboldens pro-independence groups to perpetually challenge the
central state, which the central state would prefer to avoid at all costs. As a
result, central governments will only offer more credible commitments
when support for the regional government becomes strong enough to
force the central state’s hand. Rather than consider a purely linear trajectory,
I instead expect a curvilinear relationship in which lesser guarantees are
offered at the lowest and moderate levels of regional self-governance, and
moderate and extensive guarantees increase rapidly with increasingly high
levels of regional self-governance as depicted in Figure 1. These might be
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characterized as ‘low’ and ‘high’ risk strategies for central state commitment,
and they produce my central hypothesis: Governments trying to signal greater
commitment to regional self-governance will offer more authority to consult on
or veto changes to a region’s legal status when the substantive commitment to
self-governance is relatively extensive.
The dimensions of decentralized rule in special status regions
Extant scholarship distinguishes specific forms of evidence of credible com-
mitment signals toward regional self-governance by the central state. For
example, the literature on peace agreements and power-sharing agreements
focus on their ability to reduce conflict recurrence by explicitly tying the
hands of the central state and other actors in a post-conflict environment
(e.g. Hartzell and Hoddy 2003). However, many countries establish or
redefine and deepen regional self-governance without the shadow of
conflict looming overhead. I argue that the combination of self-rule and
shared rule addresses not only whether a central state has made a commit-
ment to regional self-governance, but also whether that commitment is cred-
ible (in the eyes of the regional government and/or population).
To evaluate distinct regions on these two forms of authority, I rely on
coding from the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al. 2016; Shair-Rose-
nfield et al. 2021). The RAI is a dataset that provides utility by ‘successfully
developing a universally applicable classification of regional authority, disag-
gregating subnational levels, as well as taking asymmetries into account’
(Mueller 2014, 85). However, there are two specific reasons for relying on
the RAI for an analysis of the relationship between self- and shared rule.
First, the RAI v.3 contains data for the largest number of available countries
Figure 1. Conditional signalling of commitment to regional self-governance.
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in a systematic coding of decentralized governance within the Asian region in
the year 2018: 19 including China, India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and
the Philippines. If a central state’s commitment to decentralization can
serve as a strategy to manage or mitigate civil conflict and demographic het-
erogeneity, this is a world region in which many of the world’s recent and
recurrent cases of violent civil conflict and regionalized repression operate.
As such, a dataset that includes them is of great importance.
Second, the RAI offers disaggregation in three key areas of importance for
this analysis: (1) it provides coding for multiple different aspects of shared
rule; (2) it provides differentiated coding by individual regions within a
country that hold distinct status/autonomy statutes; and (3) it provides dis-
tinct multilateral and bilateral coding of the shared rule dimensions as they
uniquely apply to individual regions within a given country. The RAI v.3 has
scores for five dimensions of self-rule – institutional depth, policy scope,
fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and representation – and five dimen-
sions of shared rule – law-making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing
control, and constitutional reform – for 95 countries in the Americas, Asia
Pacific, and Europe from 1950 to 2018. Each ‘tier’ of subnational adminis-
tration receives a set of standard codes as long as the average population
of the tier’s units reaches a minimum of 150,000 people; most countries
have only one tier coded, though larger countries such as Indonesia (popu-
lation: 260 million) and India (population: 1.35 billion) have two and three
subnational tiers coded, respectively. Additionally, subnational units with
special agreements that are enshrined in the constitution or national laws
may receive separate scores from the rest of the units in their respective
tier. For example, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has a distinct status
protected by the Australian constitution when compared with the rest of
the Australian states; the ACT receives a separate set of codes from the
state codes.
Within shared rule, such special status regions receive separate codes for
shared rule authority that is collectively held (e.g. multilateral in nature)
versus a bilateral negotiation with the centre.1 This distinction between
self- and shared rule is not the only important one to consider in evaluating
the authority held by regional governments in decentralized systems. Within
the context of shared rule itself, there is a difference between the authority
co-exercised by all subnational units and the centre and the authority co-
exercised by only some subnational units and the centre. The former is
referred to as multilateral shared rule, while the latter is referred to as bilateral
shared rule, and it is the latter that tends to preoccupy the governments and
populations of special status regions.
The logic underpinning this distinction is made clearer with an empirical
example. In Malaysia, two seats in the upper chamber of the bicameral
national legislature are held by representatives of each of the federal states
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(negeri). Though this proportion has changed over time, the number of seats
accorded collectively to the states has never fallen below 37% of the upper
chamber. Constitutional amendments require a 2/3 majority vote in each of
the chambers, meaning that the federal states hold a collective veto over
the constitutional amendment process. This is an example of multilateral
shared rule, in which the collective body of subnational units shares authority
with the central state over matters affecting all units within the state.
In Malaysia, the special status regions of Sabah and Sarawak also possess
bilateral shared rule on constitutional matters in a key issue area: their own
constitutionally endowed and protected status. In short, the Malaysian con-
stitution prohibits alteration of any of the sections of the articles of the
constitution pertaining specifically to Sabah’s or Sarawak’s constitution-
ally-protected special status unless the Sabah or Sarawak regional govern-
ment agrees with the changes. This means that Sabah and Sarawak hold a
veto over the constitutional amendment process, but only concerning
articles or sections of the constitution that pertain specifically to their
special status and protections. This is an example of bilateral shared rule,
in which an individual special status region shares authority with the
central state over matters affecting its specific special status within the
state.
In special status regions, concerns that self-rule authority vested in the
regional government cannot be guaranteed can spell disaster for conflict
mitigation and state-building projects. Consider, for example, a territorial
unit far from central state control and capacity which sees itself as distinct
on some marker(s) of identity as well as possessing distinct governance
needs. If the unit perceives the need for a high degree of local government
control, that local government will want its authority enshrined in law or
the constitution to prevent future political events from overturning it.
Some of what makes that commitment credible is outside of the central gov-
ernment’s control: state actors have only so much ability to affect perceptions
about consistent application of the rule of law. Yet much of the credibility
rests on factors within the state’s control: the unit’s government can be
granted the ability to delay, amend, or prevent alterations to the unit’s
status. Agreeing to a region’s power to check changes to its legal status
can help signal the central state’s commitment to respecting the delineated
boundaries of self-rule authority within the region’s jurisdiction.
The relationship between self-rule and bilateral constitutional
reform authority among authoritative regions
Within the cases coded in the RAI v.3, a large number of regions are desig-
nated as having a special status, the two most common of which the RAI
codes as ‘autonomous’ or ‘asymmetric’ regions. These typically are regions
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with greater or distinct subnational authority in self-rule, compared with their
standard region counterparts. Furthermore, they are also the regions in which
commitments by the central state are likely to require some signal of credi-
bility, particularly for those where civil war or less serious forms of political
violence and insurgency predated the establishment of the region’s special
status.2 To most directly test the relationship between self-rule and shared
rule, specifically bilateral constitutional reform authority, my analysis will be
restricted to these two types of special status regions. One additional exclu-
sion criteria also applies: I only evaluate regions designated as part of the first
subnational tier of government. The rationale for this is that even where
special status regions exist in lower subnational tiers of government, their
status is often not enshrined in the constitution and they are rarely given rep-
resentation in governing bodies through which shared rule may operate.3
To evaluate the relationship between the substance and credibility of a
central state’s commitment to regional self-governance in these special
status regions, I consider the levels of self-rule and bilateral constitutional
reform authority possessed by a region. The key questions are whether
such regions have secured commitment to within-jurisdiction authority,
and whether the specific level of self-rule affects the likelihood of receiving
such a commitment. Figure 2 shows the fit line comparing self-rule authority
(on the x-axis) and bilateral constitutional reform authority (on the y-axis) for
Figure 2. Self-rule and bilateral constitutional reform in first tier special status regions in
2018. Data: Shair-Rosenfield et al. (2021).
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the 106 special status regions in the RAI v.3 dataset in 2018. The relationship
is curvilinear, with the highest values of bilateral constitutional reform pos-
sessed by the most authoritative regions on self-rule. This provides support
for my hypothesis.
Beyond the general relationship that emerges from the full dataset, a
closer look at the Asian cases reveals specific aspects of the complicated inter-
play between self-rule and shared rule. Table 1 presents the comparison
between the level of self-rule and bilateral constitutional reform authority
in all first-tier asymmetric and autonomous regions in the 19 Asian cases in
the RAI v.3. The majority of the regions do not hold any bilateral consti-
tutional reform authority, particularly those below a self-rule score of 11
(which represents a relative mid-point score across the five dimensions of
self-rule). Only the region of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in Pakistan registers
a form of bilateral constitutional reform authority, in this case the median
score of 2, indicating the region can propose or postpone alterations to its
status within Pakistan.
Table 1. Special Status Region Authority in Asia in 2018.
Bilateral constitutional reform
Self-rule 0 2 4
5 Chittagong Hills Tract RC (BAN)
ARMM (PHL)
Phnom Penh reach thani (CAM)
6
7 Guangxi Zhuang AR (CHN)
Inner Mongolia AR (CHN)
Special Municipalities (CHN)
Ningxia Hui AR (CHN)
SEZ of Hainan (CHN)
Xinjiang Uiyghur AR (CHN)
Xizang (Tibet) AR (CHN)
8 FCT: Islamabad (PAK) Azad Jammu Kashmir (IND)
9 Ulaanbaatar (MON)
10 DKI Jakarta (INO)
Gilgit Baltistan (Northern Areas) (PAK)
Pattaya (THA)










12 National Capital District (PNG) Aceh (INO)
13
14





Data: Shair-Rosenfield et al. (2021).
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Eight of the 17 regions scoring on the higher end of the self-rule scale in
Asia register consultative or veto forms of bilateral constitutional control.4
Many derive their bilateral constitutional authority from conflict management
and state-building processes. For example, the Indonesian provinces of Aceh
and Papua score 2 on bilateral constitutional reform authority with moderate
self-rule scores of 12 and 11, respectively. Each derives its bilateral consti-
tutional reform authority from a special autonomy agreement reached with
the Indonesian central state during the early 2000s, as negotiated between
the provincial governments and the centre (Bertrand 2007; McGibbon
2004). However, Aceh’s agreement has undergone change as conflict re-
emerged and required international intervention to broker peace. One of
the final issues to be resolved during peace negotiations between the Indo-
nesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerahkan Aceh Merdeka
or GAM) in the Helsinki Agreement in 2005 was a provision that the province
of Aceh be given final say regarding any future amendments to its special
status in enabling legislation. By the time the Agreement was legally
enshrined, the Law on Aceh Governance (2006) stripped this language
away and instead only guaranteed consultation with the provincial govern-
ment before any amendment to its status. While this upset some critics of
the Indonesian government, GAM’s leadership instead chose to focus on
winning control of local resources via upcoming gubernatorial elections
(Aspinall 2009, 237).
At the far end of the power spectrum, three special status Asian regions
hold veto power over amendments to their constitutionally endowed
special status, each highlighting distinct influences of post-conflict and
post-independence state-building efforts. Bougainville’s authority is derived
as a result of an internationally-brokered peace agreement and subsequent
autonomy process, providing a good example of the influence of non-state
actors in the adoption of autonomous status (Boege 2009). After the civil
war in Bougainville ended with a peace agreement, national constitutional
amendments and an Organic Law for the Autonomous Region of Bougainville
were written. A key aspect of the peace agreement was the provision that any
future amendments to the Organic Law and constitutional status of Bougain-
ville would require assent by both the legislatures of Papua New Guinea and
Bougainville, and was subsequently included in Articles 287 and 345 of the
amended national constitution.
Finally, returning to the earlier examples of Sabah and Sarawak, the two
Eastern Malaysian states that hold substantial self-rule authority, bilateral con-
stitutional reform veto authority was derived from the negotiation process
during the creation of the federation of Malaysia. Upon gaining independence
from the British in 1963, Sabah and Sarawak, along with Singapore,5 agreed to
join the then-Federation of Malaya for a range of concessions related to self-
governance (Reid 2010). This example expands upon the theoretical logic of
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Ziblatt (2004) regarding state-building in federal polities, since the additions of
Sabah and Sarawak were not required for the existing Federation of Malaya to
persist and so the Malay state needed to provide special incentives to encou-
rage them to buy into the federal system.
Implications of shared rule as an indicator of commitment to
self-rule
The data indicate that there are patterns in when and where regional govern-
ments possess a solid commitment to regional self-governance (via high
levels of self-rule authority) in combination with a credible commitment
from the central state (when that self-rule authority coincides with some or
high levels of bilateral constitutional reform authority). This is quite pro-
nounced in Asia, where long-standing civil conflicts have proven difficult to
resolve and peace is often challenging to maintain. Despite the potential
for asymmetries in centre–region relationships to lead to accusations of
unfair treatment, it is clear that central states are willing to make credible con-
cessions to self-governance only in certain cases. Thus, it appears that conflict
management and state-building need not be considered an all-or-nothing
game: asymmetries in the centre–region relationship may improve overall
function within the state by alleviating distinct sources of pressure and
conflict. However, the empirical analysis reveals the potential limitations of
assuming that legal authority always takes the same form and/or always
signals the same level of credible commitment. Here I offer some ways to con-
textualize theoretical propositions about the conditional effect of self-rule
and bilateral constitutional reform authority.
First, a number of alternative explanations have been alluded to through-
out the analysis or will be well-known to scholars of specific case studies. As
the Bougainville case shows, external actor involvement can shape the
relationship between self- and shared rule, particularly where bilateral consti-
tutional reform authority derives from a peace agreement or to conform with
a supranational legal framework. Domestic actors besides national executives
and subnational governments can also play large roles in key ways. For
example, courts may offer different interpretations of the constitutionality
of an autonomy agreement, political coalition partners may diverge in their
views about the legality of autonomy provisions, and civil society groups
may publicize how autonomy laws enable the targeting and violation of
civil liberties and political rights within a specific region. This analysis
serves as a first step toward establishing the association between self-rule
and bilateral constitutional reform authority, offering a starting point for
more nuanced understanding of the conditions under which national govern-
ments use elements of shared rule to signal credible commitment to regional
self-governance.
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Second, it is potentially quite difficult to consider all forms of special
status regions through similar analysis. As noted above, cities included in
a second tier of subnational government rarely rise to the level of inclusion
in a constitution or legislative representation, and are excluded from the
special status region analysis. Indigenous communities pose complex pro-
blems where they are not territorially concentrated (c.f. O’Faircheallaigh
2004; Zaferatos 2004). Therefore, considering how such regions would
even receive a signal of credible commitment to regional self-governance
from a central state must be made on the basis of a different measure of
commitment credibility. This will complicate comparative efforts to under-
stand the circumstances under which central states attempt, successfully or
not, to signal their credibility when regional partners are constituted in less
commonly understood ways, such as in the context of cities and indigen-
ous communities.
Finally, it is important to comparatively assess whether endowing indi-
vidual regions with both greater self-rule and bilateral shared rule leads
to less civil conflict, enhanced rule of law, regionalization of political party
support, further claims for greater autonomy or independence, and/or
improvements in living standards within the region itself. Yet, such tests
would require comparable subnational data on those outcomes across a
range of cases, which presents numerous challenges for scholars. While
such data are becoming available, especially for specific cases and particular
time periods, there are few comparable subnational datasets on outcomes
of interest to scholars of state-building and conflict for a similar range of
geographic space and time, or within-country regional variation, as the
RAI. This analysis provides a clear association between self-rule and bilateral
constitutional reform authority in special status regions, paving the way for
those with country-specific data to further explore this relationship in
decentralized states.
Notes
1. See Appendix 1 (supplementary material) for the coding scheme for self-rule
and multilateral and bilateral shared rule.
2. Appendix 2 lists the 106 cases of asymmetric and autonomous tier 1 regions in
Latin America, Asia Pacific, Europe, and North America that held special status
as of 2018. They are not evenly dispersed across the cases in the dataset, nor do
they hold a single common set of geographic or demographic characteristics.
3. Of the 123 special status regions in 2018 below the first subnational tier of gov-
ernment, 112 have no scores for shared rule while only 6 have any consti-
tutional reform authority.
4. An additional 4 regions –Delhi, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Puducherry – score 4 on
multilateral constitutional reformas subnational units in the Indian federal system.
5. Singapore subsequently left the federation and became an independent nation
in 1965.
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